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Summary
Recent outbreaks of locally acquired mosquito-transmitted malaria in the United States demonstrate the continued risk for
reintroduction of the disease. Since 1957, when CDC’s Malaria Branch started conducting malaria surveillance, 63 outbreaks
have occurred, constituting 156 cases (annual range: 1–32) that were a result of locally acquired mosquitoborne transmission.
This report describes the steps that should be taken to 1) investigate a case that might have been acquired locally, 2) prevent a
small focus of malaria cases from becoming a source of sustained transmission, and 3) inform clinicians regarding the process of an
investigation so they can effectively address concerns and questions from patients.
Although these locally acquired mosquito-transmitted outbreaks frequently involve only a limited number of infected persons,
they frequently raise concerns in the community and require substantial public health resources. For example, as a result of the
most recent local outbreak of eight malaria cases in Florida in 2003, reverse 911 telephone calls (a community notification
system) were made to approximately 300,000 residents; insect repellent, postcards, flyers, and posters in multiple languages were
distributed; public announcements were made through the media and to schools and homeless shelters; and notifications were sent
to local hospitals and physicians to inform residents of that community.
When a local health department investigates a potential locally acquired mosquito-transmitted case, the systematic inquiry
should include epidemiologic, environmental, and laboratory components. Local and state health departments inquiring about
the proper approach to investigate and control a potential locally acquired case frequently request urgent assistance and tools from
CDC. This report provides a starting point for such investigations to local and state health departments by providing them with
the tools necessary to initiate an investigation.
Introduction
Malaria is a major global public health problem. An esti-
mated 300–500 million cases and approximately 1 million
deaths occur annually (1). Malaria in humans is caused by
four distinct protozoan species of the genus Plasmodium
(P. falciparum, P. vivax, P. ovale, and P. malariae). All species
are transmitted by the bite of an infective female Anopheles
mosquito. Although malaria can be a fatal disease, severe
illness and death are largely preventable when a prompt diag-
nosis is made and proper treatment is administered.
During the 16th and 17th centuries, European colonists
and African slaves introduced malaria into the continental
United States. The disease spread, following patterns of settle-
ment, where conducive environments for competent mosquito
vectors existed. Malaria remained endemic throughout large
parts of the United States until it was eradicated during the
1950s. The eradication of malaria has been attributed to
increased urbanization and improved socioeconomic condi-
tions, which resulted in decreased human-vector contact,
increased access to medical care and effective treatment, and
reduced Anopheles populations (2).
In the United States, approximately 1,000–1,500 cases of
malaria are reported annually to CDC (3). Nearly all of the
cases diagnosed in the United States are imported from
regions of the world where malaria is endemic. However, a
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limited number of cases also are acquired through local
mosquitoborne transmission. From 1957, when the Malaria
Branch started conducting malaria surveillance, to 2003, a
total of 63 domestic outbreaks have occurred, constituting
156 cases (annual range: 1–32) that resulted from locally
acquired mosquitoborne transmission (Figure 1) (4–11). Of
the 63 outbreaks, the highest number of cases occurred in
California (17 [27%]) (Figure 2). Outbreaks also have
occurred in 23 states. Since approximately 1991, a trend has
developed in which outbreaks have occurred in more popu-
lated areas (e.g., urban and suburban areas). P. vivax has been
the predominant species involved (47 [74.6%] of 63), fol-
lowed by P. falciparum (seven [11.1%] of 47), and P. malariae
(five [10.6%] of 47) (Figure 3). The predominance of P. vivax
is attributable to the ability of this species to develop relaps-
ing infection weeks or months after the initial infection and
to a high proportion of immigrants in the United States com-
ing from areas where P. vivax is the predominant species trans-
mitted.
Recent outbreaks of locally acquired malaria demonstrate
the continuing potential for reintroduction of malaria into
the United States (Table 1). This report describes the steps
that should be taken to 1) investigate a case that has been
potentially acquired locally, 2) prevent a small focus of
FIGURE 1. Number of locally acquired malaria cases, by
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malaria cases from becoming a source of sustained transmis-
sion, and 3) inform clinicians regarding the process of an
investigation so they can effectively address concerns and ques-
tions from patients (Box).
Surveillance
The National Malaria Surveillance System (NMSS) is CDC’s
oldest surveillance system. Before 1950, surveillance was con-
ducted to evaluate the progress toward eradication of malaria.
After eradication was achieved, surveillance activities contin-
ued to monitor trends in imported cases of malaria that helped
guide prevention recommendations. The tracking of cases also
identified possible outbreaks of local mosquitoborne trans-
mission and assisted public health officials and clinicians in
understanding other cases acquired in the United States (e.g.,
cases acquired through blood transfusions).
Health-care providers or laboratories identify cases of
blood-smear–confirmed malaria among civilians and military
personnel. Each case is reported on a uniform case form that
TABLE 1. Locally acquired mosquito-transmitted malaria outbreaks — selected areas, United States, 1993–2003
No. of
































Patient interviews, active case finding, review of recent New York flight and
shipping arrivals; an entomologic survey for Anopheles mosquitoes and
breeding sites. No control measures implemented.
Medical record reviews at all clinical laboratories and hospitals and contacts
with infectious disease specialists; mosquito trapping; vector surveillance and
search for breeding sites; notification of practitioners/public.
Mosquito trapping; survey of laboratories, infection-control practitioners,
infectious disease physicians, and local health departments. Conducted
searches for breeding sites.
Not available.
Not available.
Telephone survey of 1) infection-control practitioners in hospitals and clinics in
southwest Georgia; 2) internists, family practitioners, and pediatricians in Tift
County; and 3) migrant clinics in Tift and Colquitt counties, Georgia. Mosquito
trapping and larval collection; analysis of climatic data.
Active case finding, including samples from 88 migrant workers; mosquito
trapping and larval collection.
No epidemiologic or environmental investigation performed.
Telephone survey of primary care practitioners, infectious disease physicians,
hospital infection-control practitioners, and laboratories; medical record reviews
at local hospitals; visits to patients’ homes and neighborhoods; mosquito
trapping and larval collection within 1 mile of patients’ homes; analysis of
climatic data collected from weather stations.
Telephone interviews with camp attendees, staff, families, and persons in the
surrounding community; interviews with local migrant workers; mosquito trapping;
mosquito-control measures* at the camp to kill adult/larvae; closure of adjacent
state park until surveillance had demonstrated low numbers of mosquitoes.
Notification of practitioners/public; survey of patients’ neighborhoods; review of
medical records; visits to patients’ homes; mosquito trapping.
Notification of medical personnel/public; reverse 911 calls to public; postcards
mailed to residents; posters distributed to soup kitchens, trailer parks, and
outdoor activity sites; multilingual notices sent home with public school
students; distribution of insecticide and case finding in homeless camps;
spraying within 3 miles of homes of patients; genotyping of parasite to confirm


























* Not specified in investigation report. SOURCE: CDC. Probable locally acquired mosquito-transmitted Plasmodium vivax infection—Suffolk County,
New York, 1999. MMWR 2000;49:495–8.
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is sent to the local or state health department and CDC. Clini-
cal, laboratory, and epidemiologic information is included on
the form. CDC staff review all reports and request additional
information, if necessary (e.g., when no recent travel to a coun-
try where malaria is transmitted is mentioned). Reports of other
cases are made by telephone directly by health-care providers to
CDC, usually when assistance with diagnosis or treatment is
requested. Information concerning these cases are subsequently
reported by CDC and sent to the states.
Malaria case data are reported to NMSS and the National
Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS). Both sys-
tems rely on passive reporting, but the numbers of reported cases
might differ because of differences in collection and transmis-
sion of data. An additional difference in these two systems is
that NMSS receives more detailed data regarding each case.
Investigation
Case Confirmation
When a case of malaria is suspected to have been locally
acquired, the initial step is to confirm the diagnosis. Indi-
vidual hospitals might not have extensive experience in
microscopic parasitic diagnoses, but the majority of state labo-
ratories can assist in confirming diagnoses. For states that do
not maintain such expertise or that would like further assis-
tance, CDC can provide microscopy evaluation either by
reviewing the slides or (in a near-real-time manner) through
telediagnosis (submission of digital images through the Internet
at http://www.dpd.cdc.gov/dpdx). The diagnosis should be
confirmed in a timely manner to ensure that proper treat-
ment is administered and that appropriate measures are initi-
ated to prevent continued transmission. CDC also offers a
BOX. Checklist for investigations of locally acquired mosquito-transmitted malaria
Tasks for local health departments
Task A. Confirm case
• Laboratory confirmation
• Preliminary patient interview(s)
Task B. Initiate investigation
• Involve state health department
• Contact with CDC can be initiated by the
state health department
Task C. Conduct epidemiologic investigation
• Case definition has been met
— Determined by blood smear
• In-depth interviews with patients
• Case reporting
— Confirm that laboratories and providers
have reported cases
• Active case finding
• Community sensitization
Task D. Conduct environmental investigation
• Site visit to patients’ homes
• Entomologic assessment
— Breeding habitats and vector surveillance
• Assessment of climatic conditions
— Use of temperature and rainfall data to
predict viability of competent vector
• Airport malaria
— Assess distance of patients’ homes from
airport
Task E. Conduct laboratory investigation
• Species confirmation
— Use reference laboratory (i.e., state
health department and CDC) as needed
— Perform polymerase chain reaction test
if slide microscopy is inconclusive
• Molecular techniques with assistance from CDC
— Link outbreak cases
— Investigate geographic origin of strain
Task F. Avoid potential pitfalls





— Trapping: data frequently already available
— Vector control: unclear value
Task G. Determine outbreak is over
• No new cases identified for two complete
parasite life cycles (i.e., 8 weeks)
Task H. Attempt to prevent reestablishment of malaria
• Health-care availability for immigrants and
migrant workers
• Personal protective measures: wear proper
clothing (e.g., long-sleeved shirts and long
trousers), use DEET-based (DEET concen-
tration <50%) insect repellants, and avoid
outdoor activities from dusk until dawn
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confirmatory polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test, which is
based on the amplification of a portion of the small subunit
rRNA gene (ssrRNA) (12). PCR can provide a definitive para-
site and species diagnosis when these diagnoses cannot be
determined upon microscopic examination (e.g., cases in which
the morphology of the parasites is atypical).
Preliminary Patient Interview
The investigation should begin with a careful interview with
the patient, and risk factors for acquiring malaria should be
explored (i.e., recent travel to an area where malaria is endemic,
a history of previous malaria infection, recent blood transfu-
sion or organ transplant, or contaminated needle use). If no
link can be made to these risk factors, the index of suspicion
for a locally acquired mosquito-transmitted illness increases.
Even if one of the previously mentioned risk factors for
malaria is present, locally acquired mosquitoborne transmis-
sion is not ruled out. The risk must be examined in the con-
text of the species and the timing of the infection. For example,
a P. falciparum infection will rarely present >2–3 years after
primary exposure. Therefore, a case of P. falciparum identified
with a remote travel history (>3 years) cannot easily be classi-
fied as an imported case (13). In contrast, an absence of risk
factors does not always imply local acquisition. P. malariae
has been reported to cause symptoms long after exposure, even
up to 40 years later (14). Health departments can contact
CDC’s Malaria Hotline (770-488-7788) for assistance with
species-specific information and to help determine whether
local transmission should be considered.
Initiation of Investigation
After a case has been confirmed by blood smear and the
history suggests no alternative explanation, the full investiga-
tion of a locally acquired mosquito-transmitted case should
be conducted. The investigation should include an epidemio-
logic, environmental, and laboratory component. During this
phase of the investigation, the local health department should
usually involve the state health department. This collabora-
tion can assist in the allocation of resources and prepare the
state in the event of further transmission across counties. The
state health department can then request the assistance of
CDC, which can provide malaria expertise and prepare for
the unlikely event that the outbreak involves several states and
requires a multistate coordinated effort.
Epidemiologic Investigation
The epidemiologic investigation has several components.
The first step, ensuring that the case definition has been met,
is critical. A malaria case is confirmed by demonstrating
malaria parasites in a blood film. Suspect cases include
patients with fevers of unclear etiology.
In-Depth Interviews
Cases identified during an outbreak require in-depth inter-
views to identify risk factors for malaria acquisition. If locally
acquired mosquitoborne transmission is a possibility, the case-
patients should be questioned about outdoor activities that
might have placed them in contact with Anopheles vectors,
which typically bite between dusk and dawn. An assessment
of local travel, including to surrounding counties, might help
identify possible sites of acquisition.
Case Reporting
A primary goal of an outbreak investigation is to promptly
identify all cases of malaria in the local community, both ret-
rospectively and prospectively. The health department should
confirm that health-care providers or laboratories have reported
all cases of malaria that have been diagnosed. Any cases iden-
tified should be carefully reviewed to assess their potential
connection to the outbreak.
Active Case Finding
One characteristic of malaria is that it causes an acute
febrile illness with nonspecific symptoms. Because no distinc-
tive clinical features are associated with malaria, the condi-
tion of patients who seek medical care through the health-care
system might not be appropriately diagnosed, especially if
history of travel to an area where malaria is endemic has not
occurred. During an outbreak, the local health department
can help identify patients whose conditions are undiagnosed
by taking several steps.
First, all health-care sites need to be identified, including hos-
pitals, emergency departments, urgent-care clinics, and physi-
cians’ offices. Second, each of these points-of-care should collect
all charts of patients with febrile illnesses for which a clear alter-
native explanation for their symptoms cannot be determined.
The International Classification of Diseases (ICD) Ninth and Tenth
Revision codes can be used to assist in identifying these charts, by
targeting charts with certain diagnoses (e.g., fever, nonspecified;
fever, unknown origin or viral syndrome; and fever, unspecified).
A reasonable time frame to look retrospectively for undiagnosed
cases is 8 weeks before the first recognized case. This time frame
represents a biologically plausible time interval for one to two
generations of local transmission, given the parasite and vector
life cycles. Infection-control practitioners at the selected health
facility can frequently help coordinate this process.
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After the chart review, the investigation team should com-
municate with health-care workers regarding each potential
case to request that they contact their respective patients and
assess whether the patients are still symptomatic. This contact
should be done, if possible, through the health-care workers
to protect the integrity of the patient-physician relationship.
Patients who have been identified and who have persistent
symptoms should be reexamined, and samples should be drawn
for malaria evaluation (thick and thin blood films for diagno-
sis and whole blood for further testing, if required).
Community Sensitization
Finally, an additional component of enhanced case detec-
tion is to alert the medical community and the nonmedical
population to the possibility that local transmission of
malaria might be occurring. This community sensitization
increases the likelihood of the identification of active or
future cases that have not yet entered into the health-care sys-
tem. Clinicians in the community need to be on alert to con-
sider malaria in the differential diagnosis of patients who have
a fever. Visits to select clinicians’ offices might be helpful if a
substantial likelihood exists that they might treat infected
patients. The alert to health-care providers can be combined
with a request for the reporting of confirmed cases and of
cases in which persons with a nonspecific febrile illness might
seek medical care.
Alerting the nonmedical population to the possibility of
being infected with malaria will encourage patients with symp-
toms consistent with malaria to seek care and educate others
on how to avoid infection. The risk for infection will differ
depending on characteristics of the outbreak (e.g., the num-
ber of persons infected and climatic changes). This alert needs
to be tailored to the community in question. Local health
departments have used reverse 911 calling (a community
notification system) to reach persons who have a telephone
(8) or have conducted door-to-door canvassing. Settings in
the community where large numbers of persons congregate
(e.g., church) should be targeted to communicate risk mes-
sages. Various media outlets can be considered for communi-
cating messages regarding the possible risk for malaria,
including television, radio, and newspapers. Every effort should
be made to convey the information in the languages of the
local community and to consider the educational level of the
population. CDC has designed a malaria outbreak response
tool kit that can help communicate the messages. The tool kit
is available on CDC’s website (http://www.cdc.gov/malaria/
references.htm) (Table 2).
Environmental Investigation
 An environmental investigation includes 1) a site visit to
the home of each patient, 2) an entomologic assessment,
3) a review of meteorologic data, and 4) an investigation of
any nearby airports or seaports that might be possible sources
of infective persons or vectors.
Site Visit
A site visit to patients’ homes to conduct a general review of
the household, including a search for anopheline larval habi-
tats, can help determine the probability of whether these per-
sons had contact with a competent mosquito vector. This
information can corroborate a history of time spent outdoors
and demonstrate the possibility for vectors being in the home
(e.g., a lack of screens and air conditioning in the home).
Entomology
An entomologic assessment during a locally acquired
mosquito-transmitted outbreak serves multiple potential goals.
Mosquito-trapping can identify the presence of competent
vectors that would make local transmission possible. Data on
mosquito densities and breeding locations can guide control
of adult and larval mosquitoes and activities to reduce num-
bers of larval habitats. Local and state health departments
might already have surveillance data on vectors in the area
that is being assessed.
Trapping with the intent of identifying malaria-infected
mosquitoes has limited use. If infected mosquitoes are present,
they are likely to be in a small focus, which would be difficult
to find within the large uninfected background pool.
TABLE 2. CDC tool kit for malaria outbreak response
Title of document Type Target audience
Malaria: What You Need to Know Brochure General public
Malaria and Your Community Postcard General public
Until Malaria is Wiped Out, Protection is Best Fact sheet General public
Malaria Notification Letter Clinicians
Malaria Notification Letter Community at risk
Malaria Notification Letter Surrounding communities
Attention: Malaria Poster General public
Have You Heard? Malaria Has Been Reported in Your Area Poster General public
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Molecular and immunologic-based methods are available for
identification of infected mosquitoes, and efforts are under-
way to address the utility of confirmation of positive mos-
quito pools using PCR-based methods (15–17).
County mosquito abatement personnel can coordinate
surveillance- and vector-control efforts. If these resources are
not available, the following actions can be taken to seek needed
resources: 1) entomologists at local universities can be con-
tacted for assistance, 2) a private company can be contracted
to conduct mosquito surveillance and control, or 3) the state
department of health can request entomologic consultation
from CDC.
Climate and Weather
Meteorologic data are frequently available for the county
where the outbreak has occurred. Temperature and rainfall
levels throughout the year can be used to predict the viability
and abundance of the competent vector. Analysis of weather
data also can indicate whether climatic conditions are favor-
able for the maturation of Plasmodium species within the
anopheline mosquitoes. This analysis might then be used to
guide the decision to scale-back control activities, if the tem-
perature is outside of a given range. For example, for P. vivax,
the temperature window for sporogeny to occur during the
life span of the anopheline mosquito is 60ºF–91ºF (16ºC–
33ºC) (4). A local health department that wants to prioritize
the use of resources might decide against the use of control
measures requiring substantial logistic capacity (e.g., spraying
of insecticide or reduction of breeding habitats) if the tem-
perature has moved outside of this range.
Airport Malaria
A remote possibility of a source for a malaria outbreak is that
an infective mosquito was transported on an aircraft (18) or in
baggage (19) that arrived from an area where malaria is endemic.
The distance from the airport to the patient’s home should be
ascertained and must be within a reasonable flight path dis-
tance of the competent vector to consider this mode of trans-
mission as a possibility (i.e., approximately 1 mile), although
this distance can vary substantially, depending on terrain, wind,
and weather patterns. CDC has not documented any cases
attributed to airport malaria in the United States.
Laboratory Investigation
Laboratory tools can assist and complement the epidemiologic
and environmental investigations. Techniques used in these
investigations include microscopy of blood films, PCR rRNA
gene analysis, molecular analysis of parasite DNA, and detection
of antibodies produced against parasites in the patient’s sera.
Slide microscopy is an essential part of the case definition.
If species identification is initially uncertain, a patient should
receive treatment for P. falciparum while definitive speciation
occurs. In addition to blood for microscopy, whole blood (pref-
erably pretreatment) should be stored in case additional tests
are required.
After the species has been identified by microscopy or by
PCR, additional molecular techniques (e.g., DNA sequenc-
ing) can elucidate the parasite genotype or strain. These data
can be used to track and link the cases in an outbreak. The
usefulness of this process has been demonstrated in the latest
mosquito-transmitted locally acquired malaria outbreak in the
United States, which occurred in Palm Beach County, Florida,
in 2003 (8). All eight cases were linked by genetic analysis
and were the same strain of P. vivax. Molecular analysis might
also assist in determining the geographic origin of the para-
site. However, the reliability of this approach depends on the
genotypic database that is accumulated from strains obtained
from specific geographic regions. This new technique is being
developed further at CDC and will continue to provide a use-
ful adjunct to these investigations. In the Palm Beach County
outbreak, all eight P. vivax parasites matched genetic patterns
consistent with a New World origin (the Americas), implicat-
ing this region as the original source of the parasite respon-
sible for this outbreak.
Discussion
Persons who travel to countries where malaria is endemic
and return with the infection account for the majority of
malaria cases diagnosed in the United States. However, small
outbreaks of locally acquired mosquito-transmitted malaria
continue to occur. This ongoing reintroduction occurs for
multiple reasons. A steady increase in international travel and
migration of persons from areas where malaria is endemic has
occurred, which provides a parasitic reservoir for local trans-
mission (4). This increase is coupled with the continued pres-
ence of competent vectors and conducive weather patterns
for transmission. Whereas this introduction is probably
unavoidable, ensuring that it does not lead to reestablishment
of malaria is a challenge for the public health system.
To properly address this challenge, this report has discussed
epidemiologic, laboratory, and environmental approaches to
investigate possible locally acquired mosquito-transmitted
cases. A key element is the rapid reporting of cases through
NMSS to allow for timely detection of locally acquired cases
and implementation of control measures. For clinicians,
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malaria should be considered in the differential diagnosis of
patients with unexplained persistent fevers.
During malaria outbreaks, the primary goal is to identify
all cases of malaria to provide effective therapy and to ensure
that infected persons do not serve as reservoirs for establish-
ing a transmission cycle. The team investigating the outbreak
should ensure that the usual mechanisms for reporting are
functioning properly and functioning in a timely manner,
which will help ensure that all cases are detected. The team
also should conduct active case finding and community sen-
sitization.
In the setting of a locally acquired mosquitoborne outbreak,
the topic of mass screening for infective persons is frequently
raised. Two techniques, blood films and serologic antibody
tests, have been proposed to detect either the index case or
other infective persons. A blood smear is the best tool to iden-
tify persons who have malaria parasitemia. However, in an
outbreak setting, the evaluation of large numbers of asymp-
tomatic persons in the community is typically low yield, expen-
sive, and labor intensive. Community sensitization will alert
the community to the risk for malaria and the symptoms of
infection, helping to ensure that persons who have malaria para-
sitemia will seek medical attention when they have symptoms.
Mass screening conducted by using serologic testing also is
not routinely recommended. Antibody titers can remain posi-
tive for >1 year after infection. In one study, 41% of persons
infected with P. vivax remained immunofluorescent antibody
positive 12 months after treatment (20). Therefore, a positive
serologic test signifies previous infection but does distinguish
between active and remote infection. Locally acquired
malaria outbreaks frequently occur in areas with large num-
bers of travelers and immigrants who have entered the United
States from areas where malaria is endemic. A positive test in
these persons would not differentiate who is infective from
who was infected before entering the United States. There-
fore, all positive serologic tests would require follow-up blood
smears. As previously mentioned, this technique would be low
yield, expensive, and labor intensive.
The entomologic assessment and the appropriate level of
mosquito-control activity need to be closely examined. Trap-
ping can be used to identify the presence of competent vectors,
but these data frequently are already available. Determining
how a local team should adjust mosquito-control efforts in
the setting of a local outbreak is difficult. An increase in spray-
ing for mosquitoes and other control measures are frequently
the immediate response to reduce adult mosquito populations
because these vector-control activities are highly visible to the
public. Whether additional activities above baseline-control
efforts (e.g., the use of larvacides or reduction of vector breed-
ing sites) have any value is unclear. The local health depart-
ment will need to decide whether to conduct augmented con-
trol activities and should consider prioritization of resources
in the decision-making process.
The local health department also will have to decide when
to make a statement that the outbreak is over. One approach
has been to wait two complete parasite life cycles, which takes
approximately 8 weeks. If this period has elapsed without evi-
dence of further transmission, the likelihood is that no other
cases will be identified. In certain settings, weather patterns
can help facilitate the end point. The weather might be too
cold to support the development of the parasite in the mos-
quito during the vector’s life span. Malaria is not transmitted
from female mosquitoes to their offspring, and the probabil-
ity of an infective adult mosquito surviving the winter is low.
Preventing the reestablishment of malaria transmission
begins by preventing reintroduction. Barriers to certain groups
getting prompt care, especially immigrant and migrant
populations, decreases the likelihood that a malaria case will
be diagnosed promptly and effectively treated. Persons can
prevent mosquitoborne illnesses, in general, by using indi-
vidual protective measures, including 1) using DEET
(N,N-diethyl-m-toluamide)-based (i.e., DEET concentration
<50%) insect repellents  when outdoors; 2) wearing long-
sleeved shirts and long trousers when outdoors, if possible;
and 3) avoiding outdoor activity during early morning and
evening hours because the peak biting time for many species
of mosquitoes is from dusk to dawn.
Conclusion
To prevent a locally acquired mosquito-transmitted malaria
outbreak from becoming a source of sustained transmission,
clinicians and public health officials at the local and state lev-
els need to be aware of the steps involved in an investigation
and how to implement appropriate control measures. A func-
tional surveillance system is critical so that clinicians can rap-
idly report cases, and the information reported can be quickly
acted upon. Case confirmation and assessment of risk factors
are the first necessary steps. If a determination is made that
local transmission is occurring, a thorough investigation,
including epidemiologic, environmental, and laboratory com-
ponents, should be conducted.
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